طوافِ وداع — الزام اور رفق کے درمیان

A comparative study in fiqh, legal theory (uṣūl), and the higher objectives (maqāṣid) — a critical examination of the evidences, the modes of inference, the loci of disagreement, and objective-based weighing. (Final consolidated version — on the margins of the Hajj season 1447 AH.) Prepared by Dr. Ahmed Muhammad Abouseif, President of the American Imams Academy.

Introduction

Praise be to God, who legislated the rites as landmarks of monotheism, and prayers and peace upon His Prophet, who said: "Take your rites of pilgrimage from me." To proceed: the Farewell Ṭawāf is among those questions pulled between two readings — a reading of obligation, which holds it to be obligatory and its omission to be redeemed by a blood-offering (dam), and a reading of gentleness, which holds it to be a confirmed sunna for whose omission nothing is due. The root of this tension is, in truth, the understanding of the text and the import of the command, the conception of the dispensation granted to the menstruating woman, and the characterization of this Ṭawāf's rank and its operative basis.

This study has been composed along a method that joins analysis to derivation from first principles, drawing on the method of Ibn Rushd the grandson in Bidāyat al-Mujtahid — returning the branches to their roots and uncovering the real causes and loci of disagreement rather than their surface forms. It does not suffice with relating the positions; it explains why they disagreed and where the joint of the dispute lies. The question — as will become clear — is a valid matter of juristic effort (ijtihād), and considered investigation in it inclines toward the lighter reading while according full fairness to the argument of those who hold it obligatory. The imams who hold the view of obligation occupy a lofty station in knowledge and leadership, so their positions are addressed only with courtesy and esteem; our way is to present their argument in its strongest form and then to discuss it with knowledge and deliberation, for disagreeing with them detracts nothing from their rank, and the likes of them are corrected only out of reverence and acknowledgment of the merit of precedence and leadership.

The study is arranged as: a preface clarifying the concept and the difference between the two Ṭawāfs; then a delimitation of the point of dispute and the positions of the jurists; then the evidences and modes of inference together with an analysis of the wordings and chains of transmission; then a discussion of the evidences; then the extraction of the loci of disagreement along Ibn Rushd's method; then an exposition of the analogues of an emphatic demand; the rulings on what follows the Farewell; the extension of the dispensation and the realization of the operative cause of excuse and hardship; and finally the maqāṣid-based weighing and the conclusion. In documentation, care has been taken to verify from the approved sources, to trace the hadiths, and to confine the repetition of evidences by establishing each in full at its first occurrence and then referring back to it.

Preface: The Concept, Its Place, and Its Difference from the Ṭawāf of Ifāḍa

The Farewell Ṭawāf (ṭawāf al-wadāʿ) is, linguistically, derived from "bidding farewell" upon departure; it is so named because it is the last covenant with the House upon leaving Mecca, and it is also called the Ṭawāf of Departure (ṣadar). Technically, it is circumambulating the House seven times when one intends to leave after finishing the rites, so that it becomes the last act performed in Mecca.

At the outset of the study one must guard against a common confusion between two Ṭawāfs. The Ṭawāf of Ifāḍa (Visitation) is by consensus a pillar (rukn) without which the Hajj is not complete; it does not lapse on account of menstruation — rather the menstruating woman waits until she is pure and then performs it. The Farewell Ṭawāf, by contrast, comes later, upon departure; it is not a pillar by consensus, and it lapses for the menstruating woman without any recognized disagreement. This distinction is the key to understanding the evidences of this chapter, for much error arises from applying the ruling of one to the other.

Section One: Delimiting the Point of Dispute

Fixing what is agreed upon settles much of the imagined disagreement. The jurists agree that the Farewell Ṭawāf is in general legislated; that it is not a pillar, so the Hajj is not invalidated by omitting it; that it lapses for the menstruating and post-natal woman, who may depart with nothing due; and that it pertains to one who intends to leave after finishing the rites, so that it is the last covenant with the House. The dispute is confined solely to its prescriptive ruling: is it an obligation (wājib) whose omitter sins and is bound to a blood-offering as redemption, or a confirmed sunna for whose omission nothing is due? From this branch out the consequences of omission — a blood-offering or not — the ruling for the one performing ʿumra, and the ruling on selling or residing that occurs after the Farewell.

Section Two: The Positions of the Jurists and Their Attribution

The positions of the people of knowledge fall into three. The first holds it an obligation redeemed by a blood-offering; this is the view of the majority of the Ḥanafīs and Ḥanbalīs, and it is the sounder, relied-upon view among the Shāfiʿīs, who have two positions in the school. The second holds it a sunna (or recommended) for whose omission nothing is due; this is the position of the Mālikīs, with which the alternative Shāfiʿī view agrees. The third holds it obligatory (farḍ) and its omitter sinful but without a blood-offering; this is the apparent choice of Ibn Ḥazm, for he made it obligatory by the literal text and did not require a blood-offering — consistent with his principle of rejecting analogy — but rather repentance and seeking forgiveness. Note that the negation of pillar-status is agreed upon and does not entail the negation of obligation; the contention concerns the basis of obligation, not the pillar-status that all agree is negated.

Section Three: The Evidences and Modes of Inference, with Analysis of Wordings and Chains

First: The Evidences of Those Who Hold It Obligatory and Their Mode of Inference

The mainstay of those who hold it obligatory is the hadith of Ibn ʿAbbās: "The people were commanded that their last covenant be with the House, except that it was lightened for the menstruating woman." The inference is drawn from two angles: the passive construction "were commanded" indicates a Commander — namely the Lawgiver — and thus entails obligation; and the exception "except that it was lightened for the menstruating woman" is an indication of bindingness, since a dispensation is granted only in that whose default state is obligation. This is supported by the wording in Muslim: "Let no one depart until his last covenant is with the House," for the emphatic prohibition (with the heavy nūn) against departing before the Ṭawāf indicates its bindingness. They further find support in the hadith of Ṣafiyya in the lapsing of it for the menstruating woman as a dispensation — and a dispensation removes something binding.

As for the blood-offering, they have no specific evidence for it concerning the Farewell; rather it is a corollary of characterizing it as one of the obligations of the Hajj, and then attaching it to the rule "whoever omits an obligation of the Hajj redeems it with a blood-offering," which rests on the report of Ibn ʿAbbās. Thus the requirement of the blood-offering is a corollary of first establishing the obligation — a point to which the dispute returns.

Second: The Evidences of Those Who Hold It a Sunna and Their Mode

The Mālikīs carry the command to recommendation by the indication of the dispensation; their mainstay is that its lapsing for the menstruating woman, without substitute or makeup, is evidence of non-obligation, for an obligation does not lapse on account of menstruation but is awaited or redeemed. This is supported by the continued presumption of the discharge of liability and by analogy to the Ṭawāf of Arrival (qudūm), the common factor being that each is a subordinate act and not a pillar. As for "the practice of the people of Medina," although it is a source for Mālik, I have not come across an explicit text by which the Mālikīs argue for this particular question, so it is not to be attributed to them without verification. Yet it may be said by inference that Mālik was the most knowledgeable of people regarding the practice, so had it entailed a blood-offering he would have been the most fit to transmit it; his refraining is thus an indication testifying to the lightening. As for the Ẓāhirīs, they took the apparent sense of the command and made it obligatory, holding the consequence of omitting it to be sin and repentance, not a blood-offering.

Third: The Occasion of the Wording and Analysis of the Expressions and Chains

What illuminates the import is regard for the occasion of the wording: the prohibition came in connection with the people's dispersal upon departure, as in Muslim's narration, "The people were leaving in every direction" — so the context is connected with regulating the departure, not with originating a fresh rite. As for the expression, "his last covenant with the House" expresses the sealing of the visit and the bidding of farewell to the House; the Lawgiver attached it to the House, not to the Hajj. And "let no one depart" is apparent in the emphatic character of the demand. One may find — as a light, non-binding support — that among the Prophetic directives are some in which the objective of managing the movement of the community was observed, as in the hadith "Let no one pray the ʿaṣr except in [the quarter of] Banū Qurayẓa" — while conceding that a difference remains, for the Ṭawāf is in its essence an act of worship and is not analogized to a purely administrative directive; so this analogue is not to be burdened beyond its capacity.

As for the chains: both hadiths are in the two Ṣaḥīḥs, so there is no fault in their authenticity, and the axis of dispute is the import, not the narration. Ibn ʿAbbās's formula "the people were commanded" has the ruling of a Prophetic attribution (rafʿ) without disagreement among the people of transmission, so it strengthens the establishment of the basis of the demand while leaving the dispute over its rank. The wording "except that it was lightened for the menstruating woman" remains a matter of investigation as to whether it is attributed (marfūʿ) or interpolated (mudraj), and this bears on the strength of inferring from it the attribution.

Section Four: Discussion of the Evidences

The joint of the discussion is clarifying the meaning of "Is she going to hold us back?" The Prophet (peace be upon him) supposed that she had not performed the Ṭawāf of Ifāḍa — the pillar that detains the caravan and does not lapse on account of menstruation; when he was informed that she had performed it, he permitted her to depart, thereby dropping the Farewell Ṭawāf from her. So the detention that is negated pertains to the Ifāḍa, and the point of evidence is the dropping of the Farewell; this distinction prevents the confusion of the two Ṭawāfs.

From here, two readings of one and the same hadith confront each other: the Mālikī reading, that dropping it without substitute is an indication of non-obligation; and the majority reading, that it is a dispensation specific to the excuse, which does not negate obligation for others. The decision between them cannot rest on the hadith alone — for it bears both readings — but returns to clarifying the import of the command; thus it becomes clear that the dispute is one of uṣūl over the rank, not of hadith over authenticity.

Decoupling the Bond Between Obligation and the Blood-Offering: Engaging the Comprehensive Analogy

The strongest thing the majority hold to regarding the blood-offering — and this is the real point of engagement, which must be presented in its strongest form — is a tight, comprehensive analogy: that the Farewell Ṭawāf is a rite among the rites of the Hajj, and it is established from the scholar of the umma, Ibn ʿAbbās (may God be pleased with him and his father): "Whoever forgets any of his rites or omits it, let him shed blood" — a report mawqūf that has the ruling of attribution, since blood-offerings are not established by opinion. So the Farewell enters this generality by an apparent entry, confirmed by the explicit command "the people were commanded" and the emphatic prohibition "let no one depart." This is a solid argument with an apparent basis; one who makes light of it is not being fair, and its proponents are eminent imams.

The correct engagement with this analogy is not to reject the report — for it is established and acted upon — but to deny the Farewell's entry into its generality. For the report turns on the word "rite" (nusuk), which is what was part of the very essence of the Hajj and of its acts that are bound to its time and place. The Farewell Ṭawāf is not so: it is not bound to the time of the Hajj (the Day of Sacrifice and the days of tashrīq) nor to its specific place; the Hajj is not lost by omitting it; rather it was attached to departing from the House, not to the acts of the rite ("his last covenant with the House"). It thus more closely resembles an independent act of worship connected with bidding farewell to the Sanctuary — like the greeting of the mosque upon entering it — and not a part of the rite whose deficiency is redeemed. Once it falls outside the category of the "redeemable rite," no blood-offering is due for omitting it; for the blood-offering is a financial, rite-related penalty that is established only by a specific text or a clear analogy, both of which are absent here, and the original presumption of discharge of liability repels it. This decoupling of the basis of the demand from the blood-offering is the very joint of considered investigation in this question.

Two things strengthen this path: that the Ẓāhirīs — for all their leadership in clinging to the text — held it obligatory yet did not require a blood-offering, owing to the absence of a text; so the proponents of lightening and the Ẓāhirīs, despite the divergence of their schools, converge on negating the blood-offering. The second — a vein to be completed by historical research — is that there has not been transmitted, so far as we have found, a specific text requiring a blood-offering upon the omitter of the Farewell in particular, nor a well-known report from the Companions binding its omitter to a blood-offering; rather the requirement turns on the aforementioned generality. This reinforces the original presumption of discharge in dropping the financial penalty.

The Criterion of the Rite and Distinguishing the Subordinate Act of Worship from It

Since the negation of the blood-offering turns on removing the Farewell from the category of "rite" in the report of Ibn ʿAbbās, this criterion must be clarified in a way safe from the charge of unrestrained description. The "rite" (nusuk), in the convention of the jurists, is what belongs to the acts of the Hajj that enter into its essence and validity, bound to its specific time and place — such as standing at ʿArafa, the Ṭawāf of Ifāḍa, the saʿy, the stoning, and the overnight stays at Minā and Muzdalifa — such that omitting them entails a defect in the rite itself that is redeemed by a blood-offering. It is to this category that the rule "whoever omits a rite owes a blood-offering" applies — not to every act of worship that occurs during the season.

This criterion is tested by a precise measure: the Ṭawāf of Arrival (qudūm). It is a Ṭawāf that occurs within the Hajj, yet it is a sunna in the view of the majority whose omission is not redeemed by a blood-offering, because it is a greeting to the House upon entry, not a pillar in the essence of the Hajj. This proves decisively that the mere occurrence of a Ṭawāf within the Hajj does not bring it into the "redeemable rite"; otherwise a blood-offering would be due for omitting the Arrival — and no one among the majority holds that.

By this the place of the Farewell Ṭawāf on the scale becomes clear: it — like the Arrival — is connected to the House, not to the essence of the Hajj; except that the Arrival is a greeting of entry and the Farewell is a greeting of exit and departure, and neither causes the Hajj to be lost by omission nor is bound to the time and place of the rite — unlike the Ṭawāf of Ifāḍa, which is a pillar without which the Hajj is not complete. So it is established that the operative basis of the redeemable rite is its entry into the essence of the Hajj, and that the Farewell falls outside it, so the generality of Ibn ʿAbbās's report does not reach it; its omitter thus remains upon the original presumption of discharge in negating the blood-offering, even while the emphatic character of its demand is conceded. By this clarification, the center of gravity in the question — to which the fruit of the dispute returns — is settled.

Section Five: The Loci of Disagreement Along Ibn Rushd's Method

Proceeding along Ibn Rushd's method of returning the branches to their roots, it becomes clear that the disagreement does not stem from a conflict in authenticity, but from operative loci ordered by a single root: the import of the command. The first and greatest locus: the import of the command in "the people were commanded" and "let no one depart" — is it for obligation or for recommendation by an indication? The second: the characterization of the menstruating woman's dispensation — is it a dispensation for an excuse that does not negate obligation (the majority), or an indication that diverts and negates it (the Mālikīs)? The third: the import of the exception — for particularization establishes the scope of the demand, not its rank. The fourth: the soundness of the analogy to the obligations of the Hajj in requiring the blood-offering — and this is a corollary of establishing the obligation. The fifth: the conflict between the original presumption (discharge) and the apparent sense.

Among the most precise of the loci is the characterization of the act of worship as either independent or bound: is it a subordinate Hajj-rite, or an independent act of bidding farewell to the House? Al-Nawawī transmitted the disagreement over this. Its independence is supported by the fact that it is not bound to the pillars and obligations of the Hajj the way a part is bound to the whole (it is not a pillar, nor is it performed in the time and place of the Hajj, but upon departure), and that the text attached it to the House, not to the Hajj. If it is sound that it is a courteous act of farewell, then attaching it to the rulings of the rite — including the blood-offering — is weakened.

Connected to this is an organizational dimension that uncovers the operative basis for distinguishing between Hajj and ʿumra: the majority restricted the Farewell to the Hajj, and perhaps the reason for this is — in part — that the congestion of people in the Hajj season is, by degrees, greater than in the ʿumra, and the general departure is a likely occasion for chaos of movement; so the directive came to regulate the movement of the crowds and to make the last covenant with the House a unifying point of order. This strengthens the view that it is a regulating courtesy of closure for the movement of the community, and the operative basis for distinguishing Hajj from ʿumra is thereby harmonized. That said, we do not abolish the devotional dimension in the Ṭawāf nor reduce it to regulation; the Ṭawāf is in its origin an act of devotion, and the organizational objective is only an aid to understanding the text and a factor preponderating one of its two possibilities — not abolishing the devotion nor originating the ruling. So its effect remains a preponderating indication, not an independent root.

Section Six: Analogues of an Emphatic Demand Without Censure of the One Who Omits It

What aids in placing the rank — as a supporting indication, not an independent evidence — is that the Sacred Law contains acts of worship whose demand is emphatic yet does not reach redeemable bindingness: such as the witr, which Abū Ḥanīfa held obligatory and the majority made a confirmed sunna; the sunna of fajr, the most emphatic of the supererogatory prayers; the tooth-stick (siwāk), regarding which it is stated that the hardship prevented raising it to a binding command; indeed, the congregational prayer, regarding which a severe threat came — the burning of the houses of those who stay away — yet the majority of the Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs did not make it a condition of validity nor an individual obligation.

In these analogues there is a difference acknowledged in fairness: that the Farewell has a stronger form of demand ("were commanded," "let no one depart"). But this difference affects only the rank of the basis of the demand, not the operative basis of the analogy, for the point is that the emphatic character of the demand does not entail the blood-offering. Indeed, in the witr there is an aspect that strengthens the attachment: it recurs every night and the Prophet (peace be upon him) kept to it apart from the obligatory prayer, yet it did not reach redeemable obligation; so the Farewell, which occurs but once and is not bound to the pillars of the Hajj, is more deserving of negating the redemption. Even so, this remains a supporting indication to be adduced after clarifying the import of the command, not before it.

Section Seven: The Rulings Arising from the Farewell and the Extent of Difficulty in Them

A group of jurists held that whoever bids farewell and then sells, buys, or resides must repeat the Ṭawāf, carrying "his last covenant with the House" to mean the adjacency of the Ṭawāf to departure. But the verifying scholars lightened the matter, holding that buying provisions, light travel needs, and seeing to an incidental need do not break its being the last covenant; rather what breaks it is prolonged residence, settling, and trade. The implication is that strictness in forbidding every sale and need is an over-burdening that contradicts the objective of gentleness; the point is that the Farewell be the seal of the covenant followed by departure — a subsidiary witness that the spirit of this chapter is facilitation, not constriction.

Section Eight: Extending the Dispensation and Realizing the Operative Cause of Excuse and Hardship

The established lapsing of it for the menstruating woman opens the door to refining the operative cause (tanqīḥ al-manāṭ): the cause is the preventing excuse and incapacity, not menstruation in itself. By refining the operative cause, the dispensation extends to the post-natal woman, the incapacitated sick person, the one who fears for life or property, the one who fears missing his travel companions, or one upon whom a grave hardship would fall, such as severe crowding — and the jurists have appended the excused person to the menstruating woman. Here the criterion of the great rule "hardship brings facilitation" must be clarified: what counts is hardship beyond the customary that causes harm, not the customary hardship inherent to the genus of the act of worship; so light crowding is not a ground for dispensation, while severe, harmful suffocation is.

Part of completing the investigation is that the Sacred Law builds dispensations upon the likelihood (maẓinna) of hardship, not upon its realization in every individual — as in the shortening of prayer for the comfortable traveler; so the likelihood of crowding and of missing one's companions suffices to put the dispensation into effect for one in whose strong estimation hardship would befall him. The breadth of the operative cause of excuse, the consideration of non-customary hardship, and the building of the dispensation upon likelihood — all three confirm that it is an emphatic courtesy of closure from which excuses lift it; for were it a redeemable obligation, its dropping by excuses and likelihoods would not have been so broad.

Section Nine: The Reasoned Maqāṣid-Based Weighing

Before weighing, a foundational clarification is required to prevent the illusion that the ruling is built upon the objectives alone: the apparent sense of command and prohibition is obligation, and this apparent sense is not denied to the majority; but the claim that it is diverted to recommendation needs a cogent indication, and the dispensation for the menstruating woman does not by itself serve as a diverter — yet it does not remove the possibility that the demand is emphatic but non-redeemable, so the dispute remains over the rank. The exception establishes the scope of the demand, not its rank. And the report of the blood-offering is a general root, not a specific text, so attaching the Farewell to it is a corollary of establishing its obligation. It thus emerges that the most precise point of consideration in the school of those who hold it obligatory — with all their eminence — is the basis of the blood-offering, owing to its lacking a specific text and its being built upon establishing the obligation first; and up to this point the consideration is purely foundational, after which the objectives come as a factor preponderating between the two possibilities, not originating the ruling.

Upon this clarification it appears that the certain element of the weighing is the negation of the blood-offering: the Farewell is either a confirmed sunna for whose omission nothing is due, as Mālik chose — and this is what the researcher inclines to — or an independent obligation connected to departing from the Sanctuary, for whose omission there is no redemption but repentance, as is entailed by the Ẓāhirī school; and the two views meet at the end point: the dropping of the blood-offering. There is no contradiction between our giving precedence to its being a sunna and our conceding the strength of the apparent sense of the command for the majority; what is conceded is the emphatic character of the demand, not the definiteness of obligation, and the indications (the facilitation for the excused, and the analogues of an emphatic demand without redemption) place it at the rank of confirmed sunna. And for one in whose view obligation is fixed by the apparent sense of the command, the certain element shared between us and him is the negation of the blood-offering, owing to the Farewell's falling outside the designation of the redeemable rite. The exposition of this is in six axes of weighing, not of advocacy:

The first: the original presumption of discharge of liability, and caution regarding financial substitutes — so the liability is not burdened with property to be shed except by a cogent evidence. The second: its lapsing for the menstruating woman without substitute or makeup; we do not make this a diverter of the command from obligation — for the lapsing of an obligation due to an excuse does not strip it of its rank, as the prayer lapses for the menstruating woman yet does not become a sunna — rather we make it an indication that it is not a pillar intended for its own sake and that its chapter is facilitation, so it supports the negation of the blood-offering, not the negation of the basis of the demand. The third: the indication of facilitation apparent in his (peace be upon him) permitting departure — "then let her depart" — without imposing any substitute. The fourth: the governance of the definitive universals (ease and the lifting of hardship) over the probabilistic singular reports, in their capacity as a factor preponderating between two possibilities and not as one originating; for the majority acknowledge them and yet held it obligatory. The fifth — and it is the mainstay: that the blood-offering returns to bringing the Farewell into the "redeemable rite," and it has been shown to fall outside it by being an independent act of worship connected to departing from the Sanctuary and not a part of the essence of the Hajj; so it does not enter the generality of Ibn ʿAbbās's report at all, and it is corroborated by the Ẓāhirīs' holding it obligatory yet not requiring a blood-offering. The sixth: fairness to the argument of the majority — it is a sound view with its share of consideration, solid in its basis from the angle of the apparent sense of command and prohibition and the comprehensive analogy, and its imams are too eminent to be corrected save with courtesy and esteem; yet what preponderates for us is that the basis of the blood-offering weakens upon weighing, owing to the Farewell's falling outside the designation of the redeemable rite, so a strong aspect remains for the basis of the demand, and the binding of the omitter to a blood-offering remains the point toward which the consideration is directed.

The reflective examiner, if he weighs between fixing in the pilgrim's liability a blood-offering to be shed by a generality not primarily intended for the Farewell, and keeping his liability upon the original presumption of discharge until a specific, cogent evidence arises, will find that deliberation in requiring blood-offerings is more fitting and more cautious; for the Lawgiver looked toward the preservation of property as He looked toward safeguarding the rite. Moreover, placing the Farewell at the rank of the sunnas that were emphasized yet not coupled with a redemption — like the witr and the two rakʿas of fajr — is more befitting the temperament of the Sacred Law in the seals of acts of worship than coupling the bidding of farewell to the House with a financial penalty. It is among the subtleties of this religion that the last covenant with the House be one of love, farewell, and the imprinting of the heart upon the veneration of the Sanctuary — not a fine that burdens the one departing. This is what the soul finds rest in, and it accords with the universals of ease, without any injustice to the argument of the majority or any belittling of their leadership. This is the utmost of what may be said in strengthening the view of its being a sunna and the dropping of the blood-offering — as a presentation for consideration, not a closing of the disagreement.

This is corroborated by the real-world dimension, without its being the origin of the ruling: the severity of crowding at the departure in recent times. As for the one performing ʿumra, the matter regarding him is lighter, its utmost being recommendation, by way of exiting the disagreement. The upshot is that whoever takes precaution and performs the Ṭawāf has done well and attained the sunna, and whoever omits it — especially for an excuse or hardship — there is no censure upon him and no blood-offering, on the preponderant view; and the question is a valid matter of juristic effort in which there is no condemnation.

Conclusion and Most Important Findings

The study concluded that the Farewell Ṭawāf is a later, legislated act of worship that is the last covenant with the House; that it is not a pillar by consensus; that it lapses for the menstruating woman without recognized disagreement; and that it is not to be confused with the Ṭawāf of Ifāḍa. And that the axis of disagreement is not the authenticity but the import of the command, the characterization of the menstruating woman's dispensation, the characterization of the act between independence and boundness, the analogy to the obligations of the Hajj in the blood-offering, and the conflict between the original presumption and the apparent sense.

And that considered investigation requires decoupling the basis of the demand from the blood-offering: we concede the apparent sense of the command in the emphatic character of the demand without forced diversion, and then deny the blood-offering owing to the Farewell's falling outside the designation of the redeemable rite, for it is an independent act of worship connected to departing from the Sanctuary, not a part of the essence of the Hajj whose deficiency is redeemed. The preponderant view — and God knows best — is the negation of the blood-offering for its omitter: either because it is a confirmed sunna as Mālik said (and this is the researcher's inclination), or because it is an independent obligation with no redemption save repentance, as entailed by the Ẓāhirī school. Its support is the original presumption of discharge regarding substitutes, its falling outside the redeemable rite, the objective of gentleness and the universals of ease, and placing it at the rank of the analogues of an emphatic demand. Along with this preponderance, the view of the majority remains weighty and solid in its basis from the angle of the apparent sense of the command and the comprehensive analogy, and its imams are too eminent to be corrected save with courtesy and reverence; for it is only a weighing of considered views between two valid positions — not a charging of an imam with error nor a belittling of an argument. So there is no condemnation of one who took precaution and performed the Ṭawāf and attained the sunna, nor of one who lightened and omitted it for an excuse or hardship; each is rewarded for his juristic effort. We ask God to show us the truth as truth and grant us its following, and may God's prayers and peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad and upon all his family and Companions.

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