A
Dr. Ahmed Abouseif
Imams Academy
Text size
Back to articles
Series · Episode 5
Concepts of Faith
Concepts of Faith

Ikhlāṣ in the Qurʾan

Purity from Admixture, Not Mere Intention

Dr. Ahmed AbouseifJune 23, 20269 min read

The Qurʾan describes a precise physiological scene in Sūrat al-Naḥl: "And indeed, for you in grazing livestock is a lesson: We give you drink from what is in their bellies — between digested food and blood — pure milk, palatable to the drinkers" [al-Naḥl: 66]. Milk that comes forth from between chyme (the residue of digested food) and blood, pure and clear, untainted by anything that neighbored its place. This very tangible image — the extraction of the pure from amid what is mixed with it, without its mingling with it — is the meaning upon which the Qurʾan will build, in other places, one of its finest concepts in the deeds of the hearts: ikhlāṣ (sincere purity).

Delimiting the word and the count

The root "kh-l-ṣ" occurs in the Qurʾan thirty-one times, in seven forms. Three of them are far from the axis of this article: the verb "khalaṣū," meaning they withdrew and set themselves apart (once, [Yūsuf: 80], in the story of Joseph's brothers when they withdrew to confer privately), and the verb "astakhliṣhu," meaning I select him for my special service (once, [Yūsuf: 54], on the tongue of the king of Egypt concerning Joseph) — two usages that share with the root's origin the sense of "setting apart and extracting" but are distant from the context of sincerity in worship. As for the field that concerns us, it comprises: the participle "khāliṣ / khāliṣah," occurring seven times in the sense of purity and exclusiveness (as in the pure milk of [al-Naḥl: 66] and the pure religion of [al-Zumar: 3]); the active participle of the "afʿala" form, "mukhliṣ / mukhliṣīn," occurring eleven times, the direct verbal witness for the one who makes his deed sincere for God by his own will; and the passive participle "mukhlaṣ / mukhlaṣīn," occurring nine times, a description of those whom God chose and purified, not of one who himself made his deed sincere — the first is an act the servant performs, the second an act God performs in His servant, even if they share the root and the word.

The linguistic root: from the purity of milk to the purity of intention

The origin of "khalaṣa" in the language denotes the clarity and purity that results from separation from what mixes with a thing. Milk comes forth from between chyme and blood, yet does not blend with them; pure gold is what has separated from the dust and impurities that mixed with it in the raw ore; and when the Qurʾan says that Joseph's brothers "khalaṣū najiyyan" [Yūsuf: 80], it means that they separated from the group to confer privately alone. The unifying meaning in all these usages is one: the coming forth of the pure or the isolated from amid what mixed with it or neighbored it. And when this same meaning is applied to the intention of the heart, its signification becomes: that the aim of worship come forth pure for God alone, separated from what could have mixed with it of ostentation, or the seeking of praise, or some other purpose.

Every sincere one has an intention, but not every intention is sincere

Here it is well to pause at a distinction often overlooked when ikhlāṣ is translated as "good intention": for "intention" (niyyah) in the root of the language is no more than the aim, a general, neutral meaning that includes every orientation of the heart toward some end, whether praiseworthy or mixed, pure or tainted; a person may have an intention in his worship, yet an intention blended with a desire for people's praise, and it remains, nonetheless, an intention in the general linguistic sense. Ikhlāṣ, however, does not describe the mere existence of the aim, but describes the state of that aim after it has been sifted of all that mixed with it — exactly as milk is sifted of chyme and blood without losing its being milk in either case. So every sincere one has an intention, but not every intention is sincere; and this is the distinction that makes ikhlāṣ more specific than intention and a degree above it, not a synonym for it.

The central structure: purifying the deed of impurities

This is the essence of what the Qurʾan describes as "ikhlāṣ": not the mere existence of a good intention, but the purifying of the act of all that mixes with it of other purposes until it comes forth for God alone, exactly like the purity of milk from chyme and blood. The Qurʾan affirms this meaning explicitly when it describes the pure religion: "Unquestionably, to God belongs the pure religion (al-dīn al-khāliṣ)" [al-Zumar: 3], using the very same adjective with which it described the milk, to say that worship, like milk, is not accepted unless it comes forth pure, unblended with any impurity of hidden or overt association.

A model that discloses the true moment of sincerity: the supplication of distress

The Qurʾan repeats a single scene in three different places in nearly identical wording: people who rode the sea, and the waves engulfed them from every side until they thought they were perishing — so what did they do? "They called upon God, making their religion sincerely His (mukhliṣīn lahu al-dīn)" [Yūnus: 22, and in the same sense al-ʿAnkabūt: 65, Luqmān: 32]. In the moment of extreme danger, when the heart is stripped bare of its reality and all social pretense falls away from it, these people called upon none but God alone, with no partner mentioned alongside Him even out of imitation or habit. This recurring scene discloses that ikhlāṣ is clearest when every motive for ostentation vanishes; for when there remains no one before whom to show off, and no benefit in claiming faith, innate sincerity appears in its purest form — then the Qurʾan reproaches these very people in the continuation of the verses for that, when God delivers them to land, they return to associating partners, as though the sincerity that hardship brought out did not hold firm in ease.

Another model: the servants of God whom He chose and selected

In contrast to this sincerity that the servant exerts by his own will, the Qurʾan describes a group of the prophets as "mukhlaṣūn" — the passive participle, not the active — that is, God is the One who purified them and chose them: "except the chosen servants of God (ʿibād Allāh al-mukhlaṣīn)," this phrase recurring verbatim five times in Sūrat al-Ṣāffāt alone [al-Ṣāffāt: 40, 74, 128, 160, 169], alongside other places [Yūsuf: 24, al-Ḥijr: 40, Ṣād: 83]. In the story of Joseph specifically, when he was inclined toward the woman who sought to seduce him, the Qurʾan explains his deliverance from indecency by saying: "Thus it was, that We might avert from him evil and immorality. Indeed, he was of Our chosen servants (min ʿibādinā al-mukhlaṣīn)" [Yūsuf: 24]. So sincerity here is the cause of the protection, not its result: because God purified him and chose him, evil was averted from him. This adds an important layer to the concept: that ikhlāṣ has two complementary faces — a sincerity the servant exerts by his own will in his worship, and a selection God grants to whom He chooses, so He guards him from slipping.

When ikhlāṣ joins ḥanīfiyyah

Among what deserves pausing over is that the Qurʾan, in nearly the last of its verses to be revealed, describes the comprehensive divine command gathering all previous revealed laws by saying: "And they were not commanded except to worship God, making the religion sincerely His (mukhliṣīn lahu al-dīn), inclining to truth (ḥunafāʾ)" [al-Bayyinah: 5]. Ikhlāṣ here is not mentioned alone, but coupled with ḥanīfiyyah — and the meaning of ḥanīfiyyah was detailed in the first article of this series as an innate inclination away from associationism toward pure monotheism. The verse here gathers the two descriptions because they are two faces of the same coin: ḥanīfiyyah is a creedal inclination that refuses that any partner be associated with God in belief, and ikhlāṣ is a practical purity that refuses that any partner be associated with Him in aim and intention, and both are a purifying of the servant's relationship with his Lord of all that mixes with it or contests it.

So that his left hand does not know what his right hand spends

And if the scene of the people of the ship discloses sincerity in the moment of compelling distress, the Prophetic Sunnah offers another model that discloses it in the moment of free choice, when a person is able to display his deed and chooses to hide it. In the hadith of the seven whom God will shade in His shade on the Day when there is no shade but His, the Prophet ﷺ mentions among them: "and a man who gave charity and concealed it, so that his left hand did not know what his right hand spent."[1] This image — imagining that the left hand, the nearest thing to the right hand, is veiled from knowing what its sister spent — is a rhetorical hyperbole in describing concealment from every possible eye, even the eye of one's own body. It is a literal application of the "people of the ship" criterion this article arrived at: as the drowning were sincere when every observer was absent from them, this giver of charity was sincere when he himself chose that every observer be absent from his deed, though he was not compelled to that.

The Prophetic witness

ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (may God be pleased with him) narrated — and al-Bukhārī and Muslim recorded it in their two Ṣaḥīḥs, agreed upon — that the Prophet ﷺ said: "Deeds are only by intentions, and every person shall have only what he intended"[2] — the hadith of which Imām Aḥmad said that the foundations of Islam turn upon three hadiths, this being one of them. In contrast, Abū Hurayrah (may God be pleased with him) narrated — and Muslim recorded it in his Ṣaḥīḥ — the hadith of "the first with whom the Fire will be kindled on the Day of Resurrection": a scholar, a fighter, and a spender, who performed deeds outwardly great, but which did not come forth pure for God, rather in seeking of praise, so it was said to each of them: "You have lied; rather you did it so that it would be said…"[3] Imām al-Nawawī said in his commentary: this hadith is a proof of the severity of the prohibition of ostentation (riyāʾ) and the intensity of its punishment, and of the obligation of ikhlāṣ in deeds. So the two hadiths together draw the two pans of the balance: whoever made his intention sincere is reckoned by it even if his deed be little; and whoever corrupted his intention by seeking praise has his deed returned to him even if it be great.

An objective-based (maqāṣidī) reading

The scholars note that the Qurʾan did not make ikhlāṣ a condition in pure acts of worship alone, but extended it to the whole of the religion: "Unquestionably, to God belongs the pure religion" is a general expression including creed, worship, and dealing together, not prayer and fasting alone. Some commentators link this generality to ikhlāṣ being a condition of acceptance, not a mere additional recommendation; for the deed of corrupt intention, however great its outward perfection, is not reckoned with God as a righteous deed — by the evidence of the foregoing hadith of the scholar, the fighter, and the spender. This distinguishes ikhlāṣ from many other virtues which, if they diminish, their reward diminishes; but ikhlāṣ, if it is absent, the whole deed is absent with it, because the pure, if a sufficient impurity mixes with it, its origin is corrupted, not merely its measure. For this reason many scholars of the spiritual path counted ikhlāṣ the hardest of the deeds of the hearts absolutely — not for the difficulty of attaining it at the outset, but for the difficulty of remaining firm upon it; for the impurity of ostentation may enter the deed after it was pure, corrupting it while it is on its way, as an impurity may enter pure milk after its extraction and corrupt its purity. Perhaps the most eloquent to express this difficulty was Sufyān al-Thawrī, from whom it is related that he said: "I have treated nothing harder upon me than my intention, for it keeps turning over on me"[4] — so ikhlāṣ is not a resolve knotted once and then left, but a renewed striving in every deed, because the intention, as he described it, does not settle upon one state. Of this same category too is what is related from al-Junayd ibn Muḥammad, the master of the Sufis of his time, that he defined ikhlāṣ by saying: "a secret between God and the servant, which no angel knows so as to record it, and no devil knows so as to corrupt it"[5] — a definition that meets the hadith "he concealed it so that his left hand did not know": for as long as ikhlāṣ is a secret to which none but God is privy, its greatest protection is that it remain so, distant even from the knowledge of the recording angels who record the outward of the deed, not the hidden things of the heart.

The contemporary applied dimension

In an age in which all acts have become subject to display, documentation, and sharing, it is hard for many to separate the value of the deed in itself from its echo with the one who sees it. The scene of the milk with which this article opened offers a practical criterion: as the slightest real admixture between milk and chyme and blood corrupts the milk, so the slightest real admixture between the intention of the deed and the seeking of display corrupts its value with God, even if the deed itself remains sound in its outward form. What is required is not cutting off from sharing good or hiding every righteous deed — for in displaying it there may be an example for others — but that the first motive of the deed remain pure for God, such that were everyone who sees it to vanish, neither the doer's aim nor his effort would change. This is the fine distinction that the scene of the people of the ship disclosed: true ikhlāṣ is what remains when there remains no one to see it.

This serves as a simple daily criterion by which every person can test his intention: to ask himself, before any deed he intends, would he do it if he knew with certainty that no one would know of it but himself and God? If the answer is yes, this is a mark of purity in the aim; and if the answer changes with the presence or absence of people, that is the site of the impurity that must be purified, exactly as milk is purified of what may mix with it.

Conclusion

From milk that comes forth pure from between chyme and blood, to a supplication made sincerely for God alone in the surging of the waves, to a charity the right hand hides from the left, to servants whom God chose and purified from indecency, the Qurʾan and the Sunnah draw for ikhlāṣ a single, unchanging meaning: that the aim come forth pure from amid all that could mix with it, a secret to which none is privy but God, as the pure comes forth from amid what surrounded it. And God, the Exalted, knows best; He is the Guardian of success.


Notes

  1. Narrated by al-Bukhārī in his Ṣaḥīḥ and Muslim in his Ṣaḥīḥ, agreed upon, on the authority of Abū Hurayrah (may God be pleased with him), in the hadith of the seven whom God shades in His shade.
  2. Narrated by al-Bukhārī in his Ṣaḥīḥ (the Beginning of Revelation) and Muslim in his Ṣaḥīḥ, agreed upon, on the authority of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (may God be pleased with him).
  3. Narrated by Muslim in his Ṣaḥīḥ, on the authority of Abū Hurayrah (may God be pleased with him), in the hadith of the three who are the first with whom the Fire is kindled.
  4. A saying related from Sufyān al-Thawrī, cited by a number of the scholars of the spiritual path in the chapter on striving with the intention.
  5. A definition related from al-Junayd ibn Muḥammad al-Baghdādī, transmitted in the books of moderate Sunnī Sufism in the chapter on ikhlāṣ.
Share this article

Comments

Share a benefit or a thought about the article — we welcome your view.

No comments published yet. Be the first to comment.

We hope the article has benefited you, and we welcome your comment and advice.

Ask the Sheikh